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A DISTINCTIONLESS DISTINCTION: WHY THE
RCS/ECS DISTINCTION IN THE STORED
COMMUNICATIONS ACT DOES NOT WORK
Eric R. Hinz*
INTRODUCTION
On April 30, 2003, Tamara Greene was shot dead by a .40 caliber
pistol, the same caliber used by the Detroit police.1 Mayor Kwame
Kilpatrick, celebrating his election as the youngest mayor of Detroit, is
alleged to have had a party half a year earlier at the mayoral
Manoogian Mansion. The party was supposedly attended by strippers—including Tamara Greene.2 According to a member of the
mayor’s protection unit, the mayor’s wife arrived at the party and
physically assaulted Ms. Greene.3 Less than a year later, Tamara
Greene was dead.
The murder occurred during an ongoing investigation into Kilpatrick, his security force, and the Manoogian party. This led to widespread speculation that the Detroit police had been involved in the
killing.4 Police officers involved in investigating the murder and the
other incidents were either transferred or fired, including a deputy
police chief.5 Tamara Greene’s family brought a suit against the City
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2013; B.S., Boston College, 2010. I
would like to thank the Honorable Stephen J. Murphy, III for his inspiration on the
topic, Professor Jay Tidmarsh for his continued mentoring throughout law school, the
staff of the Notre Dame Law Review for their hard work and good cheer, and finally my
family for their love and support.
1 David Ashenfelter, Mystery of Who Killed Stripper Thickens—Ex-Cop’s Affidavit in
Suit Says Officer Shot Her; City’s Lawyer Calls That Absurd, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 4,
2008, at 1A, available at http://crimeindetroit.com/Documents/Mystery%20of%20
Who%20Killed%20Stripper%20Thickens.pdf.
2 Id.
3 Curt Guyette, Internal Affairs?, METRO TIMES, May 26, 2004, http://www2.metro
times.com/editorial/story.asp?id=6269.
4 Ashenfelter, supra note 1.
5 Firing Deputy Police Chief Starts New Storm for Mayor of Detroit, N.Y. TIMES, May 16,
2003, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/16/us/firing-deputypolice-chief-starts-new-storm-for-mayor-of-detroit.html?src=pm.
489
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for obstructing the investigation. As part of the suit, they requested
thousands of city text messages surrounding the dates of the
incident.6
Later, during a whistleblower suit about the improprieties of the
mayor, Kilpatrick and his then chief of staff, Christine Beatty, testified
that the two of them had not had an extramarital affair together.7
The mayor lost the suit and planned on appealing until the case was
suddenly settled for $8.4 million. It was later discovered that the
reversal and settlement came after the mayor’s counsel found out that
the plaintiffs were seeking to introduce thousands of text messages
between the mayor and his chief of staff detailing the affair—evidence
that the mayor had perjured himself.8 These text messages led to Kilpatrick’s resignation as mayor and subsequent criminal charges.9
As the cases resulting from Mayor Kilpatrick’s actions show, text
messages have become increasingly important in both civil and criminal suits. The disclosure of stored electronic communication, such as
text messages, is governed by the Stored Communications Act
(SCA).10 The case allowing Tamara Greene’s family to discover city
text messages, Flagg v. City of Detroit,11 has become an increasingly
cited case interpreting the SCA. The Act creates a distinction between
providers of Electronic Communication Services and Remote Computing Services.12 A court must determine which category a provider
falls into, as both have different discovery standards. As Flagg shows,
this analysis is not an easy one; the court went as far as admitting that
part of its analysis could be “mistaken.”13 This Note argues that the
categories created by the Stored Communications Act do not adequately differentiate between different services, frequently overlap,
and are unable to convincingly categorize contemporary services.
Part I describes the background, scope, categories, and disclosure
standards of the Stored Communications Act. Particularly, Part I.C
6 See Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 355 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (finding text
messages from city officials satisfied the definition of “public records” and the SCA
did not preclude discovery of these electronically stored communications).
7 Nick Bunkley, Detroit Mayor Loses Fight Over Secret Papers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,
2008, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/28/us/28detroit.html.
8 Id.
9 Bill McGraw, The Rise and Fall of Kwame Kilpatrick, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 5,
2008, http://www.freep.com/article/20080905/NEWS01/809050448/The-rise-fallKwame-Kilpatrick.
10 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2006) (detailing the different evidentiary standards
the government must meet to access cell phone records, including text messages).
11 252 F.R.D. 346 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
12 See infra Part I.B.
13 Flagg, 252 F.R.D. at 363.
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delves into the different results that occur based on a court’s categorization of a service. Part II discusses some important cases that seek to
interpret and apply the Act, often with contradictory results. Part III
discusses ways the Act could be applied to contemporary services.
Specifically, it seeks to show how many common services could be considered either an electronic communication service or a remote computing service depending on the result desired by the court. Finally,
Part IV analyzes recent amendments proposed to the SCA in light of
much criticism and suggests an alternative path that Congress should
take.
I. THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT
The Stored Communications Act,14 a part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA),15 was passed in 1986 to fill a perceived need to protect the privacy of electronic communication.16
Due to rapid technological advances in computing and communication, individuals and corporations had a plethora of new options to
process and store data and communicate with others.17 These
advances pushed the scope of the Fourth Amendment as understood
in existing case law and statutes in effect at the time.18 This section
explores the background and history surrounding the Act and provides an explanation of the relevant parts of the Act.19

14 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12.
15 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C.).
16 See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555
(“[This] bill . . . update[s] and clarif[ies] Federal privacy protections and standards in
light of dramatic changes in new computer and telecommunications technologies.”);
H.R. REP. NO. 99-647 (1986).
17 S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1–2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3555 (“When the
Framers of the Constitution acted to guard against the arbitrary use of Government
power to maintain surveillance over citizens, there were limited methods of intrusion
into the ‘houses, papers, and effects’ protected by the [F]ourth [A]mendment. During the intervening 200 years, development of new methods of communication and
devices for surveillance has expanded dramatically the opportunity for such
intrusions.”).
18 See id.
19 While ECPA contains sections regarding interception of communication (Title
I) and pen registers and other tracking devices (Title III), they are not within the
scope of this Note. Further, sections of the SCA examining the civil penalties for
violations of the Act are not necessarily important for the subsequent analysis.
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A. Background
The SCA was passed in large part to cover areas of electronic
information left open by the Fourth Amendment.20 The Fourth
Amendment protects one’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.”21
This protects the inside of one’s house,22 the inside of one’s car that is
not in plain view,23 the contents of a phone conversation,24 etc. However, once a purportedly protected piece of communication has been
placed in plain view25 or released to a third party,26 it no longer
receives the same protection.
This “third-party doctrine” made it especially difficult to apply the
Fourth Amendment protections to the electronic communications
covered in the SCA. With the growth of computing services and electronic mail, individuals and businesses had many more choices in
determining their communication and computing needs.27 While
20 See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3557 (“With the
advent of computerized recordkeeping systems, Americans have lost the ability to lock
away a great deal of personal and business information.”).
21 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(“My understanding of the [Fourth Amendment] rule that has emerged . . . is that
there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ”).
22 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (citing Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)) (finding the “very core of the Fourth Amendment”
recognizes the “right of man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion” (internal quotations omitted)).
23 See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009) (holding police may search a
vehicle incident to an arrest only if the arrestee has not been secured or it is reasonable to believe evidence substantiating the arrest may be found).
24 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 358–59 (finding unconstitutional the warrantless installation of a government wiretap on a public telephone booth).
25 See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990) (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480
U.S. 321, 325 (1987); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983)) (“If an article is
already in plain view, neither its observation nor its seizure would involve any invasion
of privacy.”).
26 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“This Court has held
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities . . . .”);
see also Patricia L. Bellia, The Memory Gap in Surveillance Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 137,
139–41 (2008) (discussing how the law has responded and should respond to
increased data storage of personal information by third parties). But see United States
v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”).
27 See S. REP. NO. 99-541 (1986), at 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557
(“With the advent of computerized recordkeeping systems, Americans have lost the
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businesses may have utilized computers around the time the SCA was
enacted, the amount of computing power needed to process large
amounts of data was still very expensive. So, businesses often sent
their data processing needs off to other businesses. The problem,
though, was that as soon as they gave their data to a third party for
processing, it was controlled by a third party and was no longer subject
to Fourth Amendment protections.28
The committee reports accompanying the proposed bill used the
example of the choice faced by hospitals.29 Hospitals have large
amounts of records and data to process. While it would now be quite
affordable to process this information in-house, at the time, the computing power needed would have been very expensive for a normal
business. It often made financial sense for the hospitals to send the
information out for processing elsewhere. In the course of processing
the information, services often made copies to hold in storage in case
a backup was needed.30 However, by doing this, information that had
been protected was released to third parties, effectively eliminating
the protections.
Similar issues arose with the increase of electronic communication. Congress recognized that there was a big gap between the protections provided for first class mail and those afforded to electronic
communication.31 There was a great deal of law protecting mail from
being opened without authorization, but there was nothing comparable to protect messages sent by newer forms of technology.32 Yet, businesses and individuals used electronic communication in virtually the
same way as traditional first class mail. Congress was concerned that
this gap could create uncertainty and “may unnecessarily discourage
ability to lock away a great deal of personal and business information. For example,
physicians and hospitals maintain medical files in offsite data banks, businesses of all
sizes transmit their records to remote computers to obtain sophisticated data processing services.”).
28 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 441–443 (“[Information conveyed to a third party no
longer falls under Fourth Amendment protection] even if the information is revealed
on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence
placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”).
29 S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3557.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3559.
32 See id. (“A letter sent by first class mail is afforded a high level of protection
against unauthorized opening by a combination of constitutional provisions, case law,
and U.S. Postal Service statutes and regulations. . . . [Yet] there are no comparable
Federal statutory standards to protect the privacy and security of communications
transmitted by new noncommon carrier communications services or new forms of
telecommunications and computer technology.”).
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potential customers from using innovative communications systems . . . [and] may discourage American businesses from developing
new innovative forms of telecommunications and computer
technology.”33
Electronic communication was included within the SCA because,
unlike modern e-mail, storage of messages was an important part of
transmission.34 At the time the statute was written, e-mail was transmitted over telephone lines. A subscriber would type a message on a
computer, connect to the telephone line, and then send it to the
recipient electronic mail company.35 The message would be stored
until the intended recipient connected with the company and the
message would be downloaded to the final computer. While the provider would store the message as part of the transmission, a final copy
was actually downloaded to the recipient computer.36 The same privacy issues that occurred with remote computer processing occurred
with electronic mail because the provider, at least temporarily, had a
copy of the message.37
B. The Scope of the Stored Communications Act
To fill in the potential gaps in privacy protection, Congress
passed the Stored Communications Act. The SCA seeks to balance
the privacy concerns of Internet subscribers, while also creating channels for the government to obtain information necessary for investigations.38 The statute does this in two primary ways.39 First, it prevents
the voluntary disclosure of electronic communication to the public.40
33 Id. While Congress was very concerned with protecting privacy interests, it also
seemed concerned with creating clear standards to protect law enforcement from liability and the admissibility of evidence. Id.
34 Id. at 8, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3562.
35 Id.
36 See id. It is helpful to note at this point that modern e-mail generally does not
work this way. Unless a user imports his or her mail into Outlook or a similar program, the user will rarely actually have a copy of his e-mail saved to the computer. See
infra Part III.B.
37 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 22 (1986) (“[The provider] may technically have
access to the contents of the message and may retain copies of transmissions.”).
38 In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to AOL, LLC, 550 F. Supp. 2d 606, 610 (E.D. Va.
2008).
39 See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1212 (2004) (“The statute creates a
set of Fourth Amendment-like privacy protections by statute, regulating the relationships between government investigators and service providers in possession of users’
private information.”).
40 18 U.S.C. §2702 (2006).
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Second, the Act sets in place the procedural framework that the government must follow to compel disclosure.41
The SCA makes a very important distinction based on the prevalent functions of network service providers at the time. This distinction is one of the central aspects of the Act and is the focus of this
Note. In order to determine the level of applicable protections, a
court must determine if the service provides an Electronic Communication Service (ECS) or if it provides a Remote Computing Service
(RCS).42 Services that provide for the sending and receiving of electronic communication such as e-mail and text messages are electronic
communication services.43 The Act regulates the information transmitted and stored by these services. Meanwhile, services that provide
storage and processing are remote computing services.44 The Act regulates the use of the information delivered to, and retained by, these
services.
The SCA defines an ECS as “any service which provides to users
thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.”45 Since it is the storage of the sent information that is at issue
in the statute, the Act defines electronic storage as “any temporary,
intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental
to the electronic transmission thereof,”46 and “such communication
[as is stored] . . . for purposes of backup protection of such communication.”47 On the other hand, an RCS is “the provision to the public
of computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic
communications system.”48
41 Id. §2703.
42 See Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 362 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (“[S]ervice
providers contract with their customers to provide either an ECS or an RCS, but not
both.”); see also Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965 (C.D. Cal.
2012) (analyzing whether Facebook and MySpace provide ECS, RCS, both, or
neither); Kerr, supra note 39, at 1213 (“To know whether and how the SCA protects
the privacy of a particular communication, you must start by classifying the provider
to see whether it falls within the scope of the providers regulated by the statute—and
if it does, which category of provider applies.”).
43 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15).
44 Id. § 2711(2).
45 Id. § 2510(15).
46 Id. § 2510(17)(A).
47 Id. § 2510(17)(B). The term “backup protection” is left undefined by the statute and committee reports, leading to much of the confusion the courts have faced in
trying to classify various services. This will be discussed in more depth in Part II, infra.
48 Id. § 2711(2). Further, the Act defines an “electronic communications system”
as “any wire, radio, electromagnetic, photooptical or photoelectronic facilities for the
transmission of electronic communications, and any computer facilities or related

R
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An important point is that the designation of ECS or RCS refers
to the specific service provided, not to the providers that facilitate the
service.49 This is important because the services provided by one provider could be classified as an ECS at one point and an RCS at
another. As Professor Orin Kerr points out, the test is “context sensitive: the key is the provider’s role with respect to a particular copy of a
particular communication, rather than the provider’s status in the
abstract.”50 So, as an example,51 when one person sends electronic
communication to another person, the provider of the service
remains an ECS during the process up until the point when the message is opened.52 After reading the communication, the recipient of
the communication may decide he wants that communication for
future reference. So, he will save it through the same provider that
transmitted the message to him. Now, the provider is holding the
message in storage and is acting as an RCS.53
C. Disclosure Under the Stored Communications Act
The SCA sets guidelines for how and when an ECS or RCS provider can disclose communication. The Act first prohibits voluntary
disclosure of communication that falls within either of the two services,
subject to a series of exceptions. Then, the Act lays out the procedural requirements that the government must follow to compel disclosure
from these service providers.

electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such communications.” Id.
§ 2510(14).
49 See Kerr, supra note 39, at 1215.
50 Id.
51 This example is overly simplistic, but the nuances of the distinctions will be
further developed in Part II, infra.
52 See Theofel v. Farley-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[Subsection
(A) of the SCA applies] only to messages in ‘temporary, intermediate storage’ [which
is] limited . . . to messages not yet delivered to their intended recipient.” (citation
omitted)).
53 See Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 362–64 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (detailing
the distinction between ECS and RCS).

R
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1. Prohibitions on Voluntary Disclosure
The SCA prohibits providers of ECS and RCS from knowingly54
disclosing the contents of electronic communication.55 For an ECS,
this means that it cannot disclose communication in “electronic storage”56—that is, storage incidental to the transmission or held for
backup purposes.57 For an RCS, this means the provider cannot disclose communication held by the service solely as storage or for computer processing58—but only if the RCS provider is not allowed to
access the communication for reasons other than storage and
processing.59
Section 2702 then provides a list of exceptions for when ECS and
RCS providers may disclose content and non-content information.
Content information is “information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication,”60 whereas non-content
information would include customer records, activity logs, etc.61 Providers may disclose content information:
(1) to an addressee or intended recipient of such communication
or an agent of such addressee or intended recipient;
(2) as otherwise authorized in section 2517, 2511(2)(a), or 2703 of
[Title 18];
(3) with the lawful consent of the originator or an addressee or intended
recipient of such communication, or the subscriber in the case of remote computing service;
(4) to a person employed or authorized or whose facilities are used
to forward such communication to its destination;
54 The committee reports make clear that the term “knowingly” means the provider “was aware of the nature of the conduct, aware of or possessing a firm belief in
the existence of the requisite circumstances and an awareness of or a firm belief
about the substantial certainty of the result.” H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 64 (1986).
Further, it means that “reckless” and “negligent” conduct does not meet the threshold. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 37 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3591.
55 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2006).
56 Id. § 2702(a)(1).
57 Id. § 2510(17)(B).
58 Id. § 2702(a)(2)(B).
59 Id. This restriction was likely made in an attempt to mirror the Fourth Amendment protections. If the provider is able to access electronic communication for reasons other than the two elaborated, the argument could no longer be made that the
service is really just providing an extension of what the subscriber could do in his or
her house. The arrangement would be much more analogous to sharing the information with another person, cueing the third-party doctrine. See supra Part I.A.
60 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).
61 Id. § 2702(a)(3).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL110.txt

498

unknown

Seq: 10

notre dame law review

6-DEC-12

11:03

[vol. 88:1

(5) as may be necessarily incident to the rendition of the service or
to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that
service;
(6) to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, in
connection with a report submitted thereto . . . ;
(7) to a law enforcement agency—(A) if the contents—(i) were
inadvertently obtained by the service provider; and (ii) appear to
pertain to the commission of a crime; or
(8) to a governmental entity, if the provider, in good faith, believes
that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical
injury to any person requires disclosure without delay of communications relating to the emergency.62

The third exception creates an important distinction that effectively creates different disclosure standards.63 For an ECS to disclose
content, it must have consent from either the originator, an
addressee, or an intended recipient. An RCS, on the other hand, may
get consent from any of the above, or the service subscriber. This, in
practice, can make a big difference and can make it much easier to
obtain information from an RCS than an ECS.64 More importantly,
the list of exceptions is more noteworthy for what it leaves out than
for what it contains—there is no exception for complying with civil
discovery subpoenas.65 Courts have consistently held that this omission was deliberate, preventing third-parties from obtaining information through a subpoena.66
The non-content voluntary disclosure exceptions closely map the
content disclosure exceptions.67 In essence, non-content information
like customer records, ISP numbers, etc. can be disclosed to anyone
except for a governmental entity.68 This seems to point to a strong desire
62 Id. § 2702(b) (emphasis added).
63 See Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 359 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
64 See id.
65 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b). See generally Gaetano Ferro et al., Electronically Stored Information: What Matrimonial Lawyers and Computer Forensics Need to Know, 23 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIM. LAW. 1, 3–12 (2010) (explaining the difficulties in attaining stored communication in civil suits).
66 See, e.g., Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 975–76 (C.D.
Cal. 2010) (allowing plaintiffs to quash subpoenas delivered to providers of ECS);
Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that
the lack of “exception for disclosure of such communications pursuant to civil discovery requests” in the SCA prevents disclosure through a civil subpoena); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to AOL, LLC 55 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611 (E.D. Va. 2008) (“[T]he
statutory language of the [SCA] does not include an exception for the disclosure of
electronic communications pursuant to civil discovery subpoenas.”).
67 See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c).
68 Id. § 2702(c)(6).
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by Congress to prevent providers from voluntarily giving any information to the government.69 If the government wants any information
from a network service provider, it will need to follow the rules listed
in § 2703.
2. Rules for Compelled Disclosure by the Government
The rules for compelled disclosure by the government are much
more complex than for voluntary disclosure. While the voluntary disclosure rules treat ECS and RCS providers in roughly the same way,70
the disparity in privacy protections becomes much more pronounced
in compelled disclosure. The SCA creates a hierarchy of protections
with the most private services receiving the most protections. As the
communication becomes more distant from the originator or recipient, the process law enforcement must follow becomes less and less
rigorous.71
There are two levels of process afforded electronic communication in electronic storage by a provider of ECS. First, the government
may only obtain content information held in storage for 180 days or
less pursuant to a warrant issued by a court of competent jurisdiction.72 This means that for up to 180 days, the government will need
to obtain a warrant to retrieve a person’s unopened e-mail. After 180
days, the information in storage will be treated in the same manner as
RCS storage, allowing for more options and less process. First, like
pre-180 days ECS storage, the government can use a warrant to get
content information from an RCS or from an ECS after 180 days.73
The government may do so without notice. Second, the government
may avoid getting a warrant and obtain information by providing
notice74 and an administrative subpoena or a 2703(d) order.75 A
69 Orin Kerr points out the redundancy of this exception. See Kerr, supra note
39, at 1222 & n.94. The sixth exception allows a provider to give non-content information to anyone but a governmental entity. Yet, the restrictions on voluntary disclosure of non-content information in § 2702 specifically apply only to the government.
So, the exception in § 2702(c) is unnecessary. Id.
70 See supra Part I.C.1.
71 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703.
72 Id. § 2703(a).
73 Id. § 2703(b)(A).
74 Section 2705 allows notice to be delayed for up to ninety days if a court or
supervisory official believes notification may have adverse results. The section lists
adverse results as endangering an individual, risk of flight, tampering of evidence and
witnesses, or “otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a
trial.” Id. § 2705(a)(2).
75 Id. § 2703(b)(B). The SCA treats post-180 days ECS content the same as all
RCS content. Id.

R
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2703(d) order can be obtained from any court so long as the governmental entity can present “specific and articulable facts” reasonably
demonstrating that the contents or records sought are relevant to the
investigation.76
As the trend would indicate, even less process is required for
compelling disclosure of non-content records. The government may
require disclosure pursuant to a warrant,77 with a 2703(d) specific and
articulable facts order,78 or through the consent of the subscriber or
customer.79 Lowering the burden from content disclosure, the SCA
does not require the government to provide notice to the subscriber
or customer when the government is compelling non-content information.80 For certain non-content communication, the government
must merely provide a subpoena to a network service provider.81 The
government can get such basic information about a subscriber or customer as his or her name, address, connection records and times, start
dates, identity numbers such as telephone numbers or network
addresses, and means of payment such as credit card numbers.82
Through these differing process requirements, the importance of
distinguishing whether a provider storing information is acting as an
ECS or an RCS becomes clear. In the realm of § 2702 voluntary disclosure, the rule is almost the same for both types of public providers:
barring certain exceptions, either provider may not voluntarily83 dis76 Id. § 2703(d). A 2703(d) order may be issued pursuant to this SCA “by any . . .
court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the governmental entity offers
specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”
Id.
77 Id. § 2703(c)(1)(A).
78 Id. § 2703(c)(1)(B).
79 Id. § 2703(c)(1)(C). The SCA also allows the government to compel disclosure of non-content information by merely submitting a formal request when it is
relevant to an “investigation concerning telemarketing fraud.” Id. § 2703(c)(1)(D).
80 Id. § 2703(c)(3). The ability to obtain this information without any notice to
the subscriber has been increasingly criticized lately. The government frequently
requires ISPs to secretly disclose customer information and contacts. See Julia
Angwin, Secret Orders Target Email: WikiLeaks Backer’s Information Sought, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 9, 2011, 10:31 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203476
804576613284007315072.html?mod=wsj_share_facebook (detailing the U.S. government’s “secret court order” to Google and small Internet provider Sonic.net Inc. to
“turn over information from the email accounts” of WikiLeaks volunteer Jacob
Appelbaum).
81 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2).
82 Id. § 2703(c)(2)(A)–(F).
83 This includes civil subpoenas. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
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close content information to anyone, and may not voluntarily disclose
non-content customer records to the government.84 However, there
is an important aspect of voluntary disclosure where the distinction
between ECS and RCS matters: the exception for consent.85 A provider of ECS must have the consent of the sender or the receiver of
the communication, while a provider of RCS need only get consent of
the subscriber to the service.86 This has large implications since many
services are subscribed to by a larger organization, like a company, for
use by its members or employees. In the course of civil litigation, an
opposing party may seek the stored emails of an individual. If an
employee (sender or recipient) refuses to give consent for disclosure,87 but the company (subscriber) is willing to consent, the party
seeking disclosure will only be able to get to information if the service
provider can be classified as an RCS. With § 2703 compelled disclosure, the differences in treatment of ECS and RCS providers are even
more pronounced. The government may only compel a provider of
ECS to disclose information stored for less than 180 days pursuant to a
warrant.88 However, if the government can classify the provider of
electronic storage as an RCS, it may merely provide the customer
notice and send a subpoena or a § 2703(d) specific and articulable
facts order.89 Further, this notice may even be delayed for up to
ninety days if it would adversely affect a trial.90
II.

CONFUSION

IN THE

COURTS

There has been a great deal of disagreement and confusion
among the courts when it comes to classifying various types of services
provided as either ECSs or RCSs. Some of this confusion comes from
inherent structural flaws in the statute. This involves two related
issues. First, whether communication held “for purposes of backup
protection” should be understood expansively or narrowly.91 Second,
84 See supra Part I.C.1.
85 See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3).
86 See id.; see also Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 359–63 (E.D. Mich.
2008) (demonstrating that obtaining the necessary consent for discovery of text
messages is much simpler if the service provider can be classified as an RCS rather
than an ECS).
87 But see Flagg, 252 F.R.D. at 352–58 (holding that consent can be compelled
under FED. R. CIV. P. 34).
88 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
89 Id. § 2703(b).
90 Id. § 2705; see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
91 See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 902–03 (9th Cir.
2008).
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in evaluating the relevant classifications, whether the court should
look at the particular service provided for that particular piece of
communication, or if it should look at the services provided by the
provider and classify the provider itself.92 Meanwhile, other confusion
comes from the development of new and overlapping types of communications services since the enactment of the Act. Due to the
changing ways communication is transmitted, it is difficult to categorize the various services. Analogizing to older forms of electronic services happens imperfectly and with conflicting results.93 This section
analyzes the ways some courts have approached these issues. As one
will see, with all of the confusion, it would be quite easy for a court to
classify most electronic services however it wants.
A. Theofel v. Farely-Jones
As has been discussed above, communication stored by an ECS
provider is protected if the storage is (A) temporary, intermediate,
and incidental to the transmission, or (B) for purposes of backup protection.94 Confusion arose as to the status of post-transmission
messages still in storage by the provider. Is this what was meant by
“backup protection”? Many concluded from the legislative history
and the technology at the time that backup protection referred to
copies the service provider made while the message was on the provider’s server in case an issue arose.95 These copies could be left on
the server for some time, but were not meant as storage for the subscriber. If the user left the messages on the server post-delivery, they
would be using the service as an RCS.96
However, the Ninth Circuit decided to take a very different
approach when it decided Theofel v. Farley-Jones,97 finding that “for
purposes of backup protection” should be interpreted expansively.
92 Compare Flagg, 252 F.R.D. at 362 (holding that the classification of the service
provider changes based on the particular service it is providing), with Quon, 529 F.3d
at 902–03 (classifying provider Arch Wireless based on the type of services it generally
provides).
93 See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 988–89 (C.D. Cal.
2010) (finding it difficult to classify Facebook and MySpace wall posts and
comments).
94 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17).
95 See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 8 (1986) reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3562.
See also Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 633–34 (E.D. Pa.
2001) (holding that backup protection involved storage pending delivery, but not
post-delivery storage).
96 See Kerr, supra note 39, at 1216–17.
97 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004).
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The case arose out of earlier commercial litigation against FarleyJones. In the course of discovery, Farley-Jones sent a subpoena to NetGate, the plaintiffs’ Internet Service Provider (ISP), for all of the
plaintiffs’ emails.98 NetGate initially protested, but provided a sample
of emails.99 The plaintiffs, on hearing of this, asked the magistrate
judge to quash the order and also filed a civil suit for violations of the
Stored Communications Act, among other statutes. The district court
dismissed the claims, bringing this case before the Ninth Circuit.100
In determining if these emails were protected under the ECS
rules, the court had to first determine if they were in electronic storage. The panel agreed with the determinations of other courts101 that
these emails could not be considered in electronic storage under subsection (A) because they had already been delivered and were not in
“‘temporary, intermediate storage.’”102 However, departing from
conventional wisdom, the court found that the messages “do fit comfortably within subsection (B).”103 Accordingly, these messages were
clearly stored for backup protection “within the ordinary meaning of
those terms.”104
The court disagreed with previous courts, and arguments by the
United States,105 that backup protection could not include post-transmission storage: subsection (A) already covers any stored communication pending delivery. By interpreting subsection (B) to only cover
pre-transmission communication, subsection (B) would be completely
superfluous.106 Rather, unlike (A), (B) does not distinguish between
pre- and post-transmission storage. With that interpretation, then, the
court found that “prior access [wa]s irrelevant.”107
Further, the court held that backup copies did not need to be
held solely for use by the ISP: an “obvious purpose” for storing backup
98 Id. at 1071.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1071–72.
101 See, e.g., In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 512
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (limiting coverage to messages awaiting delivery); Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 636 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (same).
102 Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(A) (2006)).
103 Id. Electronic storage is “any storage of such communication by an electronic
communication service for purposes of backup protection of such communication.”
18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(B).
104 Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075.
105 The government’s position “drains subsection (B) of independent content
because virtually any backup of a subsection (A) message will itself qualify as a message in temporary, intermediate storage.” Id. at 1076.
106 Id. at 1075–76.
107 Id. at 1077.
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copies was to have another copy in case the user wanted to download
it again.108 However, the court did not go so far as to say that all
stored copies were for backup protection. If an ISP kept permanent
copies of the communication, or if the ISP was the only place the user
was storing his messages, it would no longer be providing storage for
purposes of backup protection.109 Since the distinction between
backup and non-backup could not be made by prior access, the court
introduced the idea that messages had lifespans.110 The lifespan of a
backup was tied to the life of the underlying message.111 Once that
message expired, the copy could no longer be considered for backup
purposes.112 It is important to note that the court never explained
what the “lifespan” or “normal course” might be.
Other courts and scholars have been very critical of this result.113
Professor Orin Kerr believes the Ninth Circuit’s approach “is quite
implausible and hard to square with the statutory text.”114 He argues
that the subsection (B) backup protection provision exists as an
attempt to provide a backstop to subsection (A).115 Service providers
make copies of messages for administrative purposes. Since these copies are not the actual communication, they may not qualify for protection under subsection (A). The provision for backup protection
keeps these copies from being released.116 Further, he criticizes the
court for its lifespan distinction. The 180 days limit in § 2703 “contemplates that e-mails can be in ‘electronic storage’ for a long, long
time.”117
B. Quon v. Arch Wireless
While the court in Theofel, determined that “backup protection”
should be interpreted expansively, it left room for future courts to
work out how long something could be in storage before it was no
108 Id. at 1075.
109 Id. at 1076.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 See infra Parts II.C.–D.
114 Kerr, supra note 39, at 1217.
115 Id. at 1217 n.61.
116 Id. Kerr further develops this idea, arguing that “the most obvious statutory
signal is the text of 18 U.S.C. § 2704, entitled ‘Backup Preservation.’ Section 2704
makes clear that the SCA uses the phrase ‘backup copy’ in a very technical way to
mean a copy made by the service provider for administrative purposes.” Id. (citation
omitted).
117 Id. at 1218 n.61 (citation omitted).
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longer held by an RCS. However, it did seem to make clear that if the
server is the only place the message is stored, it is no longer acting as
an ECS.118 Five years later, in Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co.,119
the Ninth Circuit had occasion to revisit the holding. Rather than
give more guidance on the “lifespan” of communication, the court
more fully committed to the idea that a service storing post transmission communication would continue to be considered an ECS indefinitely.120 In doing so, it explored the second issue, determining that
the provider should be classified as a whole, rather than classifying
individual services provided.121
The City of Ontario contracted with Arch Wireless to provide
text-messaging services and devices to City employees.122 In the
course of transmission, the messages were stored on Arch Wireless’s
servers and a copy was made for an archive.123 The City began to
worry that the devices were being used for non-work related purposes.124 The City requested transcripts of the text messages from certain pagers, including Quon’s, and Arch Wireless complied.125 The
City’s review of these messages, many of which were sexually explicit,
led to an internal affairs investigation into Quon’s behavior.126 The
disclosure and subsequent review of the text messages led to this suit
for, among others, violations of the SCA.127
The district court granted summary judgment against Quon.
Since the messages were already transmitted, the court found that
118 Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004).
119 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
120 Id. at 902–03.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 895.
123 Id. at 895–96. The court thoroughly described the path the messages take:
The message leaves the originating pager via a radio frequency transmission.
The transmission is received by any one of many receiving stations, which
are owned by Arch Wireless. Depending on the location of the receiving
station, the message is then entered into the Arch Wireless computer network either by wire transmission or via satellite by another radio frequency
transmission. Once in the Arch Wireless computer network, the message is
sent to the Arch Wireless computer server. Once in the server, a copy of the
message is archived. The message is also stored in the server system, for a
period of up to 72 hours, until the recipient pager is ready to receive the
delivery of the text message.
Id.
124 Id. at 897–98.
125 Id. at 898.
126 Id.
127 Id.
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Arch Wireless was acting as an RCS.128 Since the City was the “subscriber,” there was no violation of the SCA by disclosing messages at
the City’s request.129 The Ninth Circuit disagreed and overturned the
district court judgment, holding that Arch Wireless was an ECS.130
It was undisputed that the City was a subscriber to the service.131
The question, then, turned on whether Arch Wireless was an ECS or
an RCS.132 The court looked at the “nature of the services” offered in
order to classify Arch Wireless.133 At its core, Arch Wireless offered a
service that allowed users to send and receive messages electronically.
That “more appropriately” fit the definition of an ECS.134 It was no
problem that Arch Wireless also archived the messages indefinitely.
According to the court, Congress was clear on what was meant by
“‘storage and processing’” for purposes of an RCS.135 Storage was
seen as a “virtual filing cabinet,” and processing referred to “‘sophisticated data processing services.’”136 Thus, the court followed Theofel in
determining that Arch Wireless was a “conduit for the transmission”
and stored the messages as backup protection “‘for the user,’” and so
was a provider of ECS.137
In taking this approach, the court seemed to be taking a step further than Theofel in classifying the provider as a whole, as opposed to
classifying the service being provided at any given moment.138 The
court did not look at each individual service provided and then designate each service separately. Rather, the court seemed to look at the
various services provided and then determine whether in sum they
pointed toward a designation of ECS or RCS. So, since electronic
messaging was the main reason for the agreement, the provider was
considered an ECS. The other services provided, such as archiving,
were merely supplemental. Despite the fact that an archive of text
messages could easily be considered a virtual filing cabinet, the desig128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 903.
131 Id. at 900.
132 If an RCS, there was no violation since the City was a subscriber. However, if
an ECS, then there was a violation since the City was not a transmitter or receiver. See
supra Part I.C.1.
133 Quon, 529 F.3d at 900.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 902 (citation omitted).
136 Id. (citation omitted).
137 Id. (citation omitted).
138 The court points in this direction from the start when it says, “[t]he nature of
the services Arch Wireless offered to the City determines whether Arch Wireless is an
ECS or an RCS.” Id. at 900.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL110.txt

2012]

unknown

Seq: 19

a distinctionless distinction

6-DEC-12

11:03

507

nation of Arch Wireless did not change because that “[wa]s not the
function Arch Wireless contracted to provide here.”139 Further, it
quickly dismissed comments in Theofel that permanent storage would
point toward the service changing from an ECS to an RCS.140 Despite
the indefiniteness of the archives, there was no indication that Arch
Wireless kept the messages permanently.141 The implication seems to
be that a provider can keep copies of messages after transmission in
storage indefinitely and still be considered an ECS so long as it is
never specified that the storage will be permanent.
C. Flagg v. City of Detroit
In resolving the issue of stored text messages in the case of
Tamara Greene,142 the court in Flagg v. City of Detroit143 took a very
different route than the Ninth Circuit, holding that the stored
messages were discoverable. The court in Flagg was faced with a very
similar service as the court in Quon—stored text messages. The court
ultimately concluded the messages were discoverable and that the service was most likely acting as an RCS once the stored messages had
been received.144 However, while the court was sure of its result, it
never seemed confident in its reasoning, and so it took five different
analytical routes to reach its result.145 Further, rather than responding to the actual request, the court analyzed the situation as if the
plaintiff had proceeded differently,146 and then instructed him to
resubmit the request.147
The City of Detroit had contracted with SkyTel to provide text
messaging devices and services to City employees. The contract was
discontinued in 2004, but SkyTel retained copies of the communication.148 The plaintiff sought all texts sent and received by thirty-four
individuals over five years, and texts by all city officials sent during the
four-hour time period surrounding the plaintiff’s mother’s death.149
The defendants argued that SkyTel could not divulge the messages
due to the Stored Communications Act. The Act only allowed for dis139 Id. at 902.
140 See id. at 902–03.
141 Id.
142 See supra INTRODUCTION.
143 252 F.R.D. 346 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
144 Id. at 362–63.
145 See id. at 348–50, 352, 358.
146 Id. at 358.
147 Id. at 366.
148 Id. at 347–48.
149 Id. at 348.
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closure of messages with the consent of the subscriber. The City said
that since it was the subscriber, SkyTel could only release the messages
with its consent, which it refused to give.150
The court started with a discussion of procedure. The plaintiff
had requested the messages by sending a third-party subpoena to
SkyTel.151 However, the court thought that the SCA could apply differently to third party subpoenas versus requests directly to the subscriber through a Rule 34 document request.152 Since the former
route would lead to a much more complicated inquiry,153 the court
decided to ignore the actual request and “proceed[ ] under the premise” that the plaintiff had used a Rule 34 request.154 Rule 34
requires a party to produce any requested documents under the
responding party’s control.155 The court explained that “control”
included any documents the party had the right to obtain, not just
those in its physical possession.156 Therefore, if the City had the right
to obtain the messages from SkyTel, it had to provide them through a
Rule 34 request.157
The court then proceeded to interpret the SCA in five different
ways, all with the result that the City had to provide the messages.
First, the court posited that the SCA applied differently to requests
from the subscriber than to requests from a third party.158 The SCA
prohibits both ECS and RCS providers from “divulg[ing]” the content
of electronic communication.159 Providing content to an outside
party would clearly be “divulging,” and therefore a violation.160 How150 Id. at 354–55.
151 Id. at 352.
152 Id. at 358.
153 This is ironic seeing as the route the court eventually took was premised on a
fiction that ultimately resulted in an in-depth and complicated analysis under five
different routes.
154 Id. at 358.
155 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1) (“A party may serve on any other party a request
within the scope of Rule 26(b) . . . to produce and permit the requesting party or its
representative to inspect, copy, test, or sample . . . items in the responding party’s
possession, custody, or control . . . .”).
156 Flagg, 252 F.R.D. at 353.
157 Id. at 355.
158 Id. at 358.
159 See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (2006) (“[A] person or entity providing an electronic communication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any person
or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that service
. . . .”).
160 Id.
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ever, by the plain meaning of the word “divulge,”161 one could hardly
argue that providing the contents to the subscriber who asked for the
contents to be saved is “divulging” content in violation of the act.162
Second, the court posited that the SCA would not even apply if
SkyTel was an RCS.163 An RCS is prohibited from divulging content
only if the service provider is not “‘authorized to access the contents
of any such communications for purposes of providing any services
other than storage or computer processing.’”164 If the contract provided a mechanism for the City to request retrieval of the messages
from SkyTel, that would be the needed “authorization to access” that
would take SkyTel’s services outside the restrictions of the SCA.165
Therefore, under this theory, the SCA did not apply, and SkyTel
could divulge the messages.166 The court was most surely wrong in
this argument. As the court even points out in the next justification,
storage would be of little use without a mechanism to retrieve the
messages. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that retrieval would take
SkyTel’s storage services outside the scope of the Act.
Third, the court posited that if its analysis in the second justification was wrong and the activity did fall within § 2702(a), there might
be another applicable exception besides lawful consent of the subscriber.167 The SCA allows for disclosure if it would be “‘necessarily
incident to the rendition of the service.’”168 An archive of text
messages would be of little use without a mechanism for retrieving
them.169 Therefore, retrieval for the City would be “necessarily inci161 The court cites the definition of divulge in Webster’s Dictionary as: “ ‘mak[ing]
known’ or revealing something which is ‘private or secret.’ ” Flagg, 252 F.R.D. at 358
(quoting WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 370 (9th ed. 1986)).
162 Id. at 358 (“By fulfilling a request from its customer, the City, to retrieve and
forward communications from an archive that has been created and maintained at
the customer’s request, SkyTel cannot necessarily be characterized as having
‘divulged’ any information to anyone outside the scope of the confidential relationship . . . .”).
163 Id. (“If the archive and retrieval service provided by SkyTel qualifies as an RCS,
it is still more doubtful that this sort of retrieval would run afoul of § 2702(a).”).
164 Id. at 359 (“[T]o the extent that the contracts between the City and SkyTel
provide a mechanism for the City to request the retrieval of text messages from the
archive maintained by SkyTel, such a request presumably would supply the necessary
‘authoriz[ation]’ . . . .” (quoting18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(2))).
165 Id. at 359.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(5)).
169 Id.
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dent to” the storage. So, consent of the City may not have even been
needed.170
Fourth, in the most important and likely most accurate reading of
the SCA, the City had the “lawful consent” needed to get the messages
since SkyTel was acting as an RCS, and the City was the subscriber.171
Since this result was at odds with Quon, the court began by criticizing
the Ninth Circuit’s analysis and conflicting holding. According to the
court, Quon took an “‘all or nothing’ approach”172 whereby it
“broadly” categorized Arch Wireless as “providing a service for sending and receiving messages,” not as computer storage.173 Therefore,
messages were stored for backup protection.174 The Ninth Circuit
relied on a “unitary approach” where a contract was to provide one or
the other, but not both.175 However, the court here claimed that
§ 2702(a) focused on specific types of services with regard to a specific
piece of information, not the provider as a whole.176 The inquiry was
to what the service was presently doing with the piece of communication. While SkyTel had acted as an ECS while transmitting the
messages, at the time of the suit it was holding the messages in an
archive as a “virtual filing cabinet,” and therefore holding them in
computer storage.177 Even though SkyTel was an RCS, the City was
still able to give its consent as a subscriber and was obliged to do so
under Rule 34.178
Finally, still not satisfied that it had covered all of its bases, “even
if the [c]ourt is mistaken[,]”179 the court analyzed the situation as if
SkyTel was acting not as an RCS but as an ECS as under the Quon
framework.180 In this situation, SkyTel could have only released the
messages with consent of the user.181 Since the users were all City
170 Id.
171 Id. at 359–63.
172 Id. at 360.
173 Id. at 361.
174 Id. at 361–62.
175 Id. at 362.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 363 (“[T]he service provided by SkyTel may properly be characterized as
a ‘virtual filing cabinet’ of communications sent and received by City employees.”
(citation omitted)).
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 363–64.
181 Id. at 359 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3) (2006)) (“If this service is deemed to
be an RCS, then the consent of the ‘subscriber’ is sufficient to permit the service
provider to divulge the contents of a communication maintained on this service.”).
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employees, the City could have forced their consent.182 The employees were clearly told that their communication could be monitored,
and they acceded to a policy allowing access.183
After finally concluding that, at least in some way or another, the
City could retrieve the messages and could be compelled to do so by a
Rule 34 request, “[t]he court [found] it best to avoid [the third-party
subpoena] question, and to instead insist that [p]laintiff reformulate
his third-party subpoena as a Rule 34 request for production directed
at the [d]efendant City.”184
D. Crispin v. Christian Audigier
In Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc.,185 a district court case in the
Ninth Circuit, the court was forced to apply the SCA to newer forms of
electronic communication, illustrating the additional complications
that arise. Crispin, an artist, had licensed the defendants to print his
artwork on clothing for a fee and required them to include his
logo.186 This suit arose out of claims that the defendants breached
the contract by sublicensing the art and not properly attributing it to
Crispin.187 In the course of the litigation, the defendants subpoenaed
three third-parties for basic subscriber information and all communication related to the defendants—Media Temple (webmail),
Facebook, and MySpace (social networking).188 Crispin moved to
quash the subpoenas on the grounds that, among others, they violated
the SCA.189
The court realized that it must classify these services as either
providers of ECS, RCS, or neither. The court sought to show how
both Quon and Flagg were reconcilable and merely applied the same
rule to different factual scenarios190—something the court in Flagg
182 Id. at 364 (citing Riddell Sports Inc. v. Brooks, 158 F.R.D. 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y.
1994)).
183 Id. at 364–65. This is especially true for one of the primary challengers, Mayor
Kilpatrick, who put the policy in place. Id.
184 Id. at 366; see also Timothy G. Ackerman, Consent and Discovery Under the Stored
Communications Act, THE FED. LAW., Nov./Dec. 2009, at 42, 44–45 (explaining the role
Flagg plays in electronic discovery disputes).
185 717 F. Supp. 2d 965 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
186 Id. at 968.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 969.
190 Id. at 987 (“For this reason, Weaver and Flagg do not conflict with Ninth Circuit
precedent; indeed, they apply the rule set forth . . . to different factual circumstances.”). This is ironic, seeing as the two providers provided the exact same service.
See supra Part II.B–C.
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did not think could be done. The court dismissed the Ninth Circuit’s
application of ECS to both pre- and post-reception communication in
Theofel and Quon by saying the court there was referring to a specific
type of communication, not ECS providers generally.191 Unlike the
courts in Theofel and Quon, the court looked to the particular service
provided, not the provider as a whole. Since the provider in Flagg no
longer provided messaging services, it fell into Theofel’s RCS category
because it was the only place the messages were stored, ignoring the
fact that Flagg clearly had rejected Theofel’s contention that a received
message could be held by an ECS. Therefore, the court concluded
that all of the cases just “apply the rule set forth in Theofel to different
factual circumstances”192—that is, if the opened messages were only
stored on the providers servers, it could have been considered an ECS.
After interpreting Ninth Circuit precedent in a way that allowed
for contrary results, the court looked at the service provided. Media
Temple provided “webmail” services. Webmail is analogous to the
electronic messaging contemplated in the committee reports. However, unlike email at that time, where messages were retrieved and
downloaded, here the messages remained on the provider’s server
where a user would go to view the message.193 The services defaulted
to storing the messages only on the provider’s server. The court
found that the provider was clearly acting as an ECS while the
messages were stored but had not been read.194 However, once the
user viewed the message, unless he downloaded it to his computer,
the provider acted as an RCS because the provider was the only place
the message was stored, and it was not there for backup protection.195
The court argued that this was in accord with Theofel and Quon.
However, Ninth Circuit precedent in Theofel and Quon would lead one
to think that, at least for webmail, the stored communication would
be held by an ECS.196 Like the providers in both of those cases, Media
Temple provided, at its core, a service to send and receive
messages.197 Prior to viewing the messages, the communications
would clearly have fallen under section (A) as temporary intermediate
storage. As construed in Theofel and Quon, section (B) backup protection would certainly apply after the communication was viewed. Like
in Theofel and Quon, the messages were left there so that the user
191
192
193
194
195
196
197

Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 987.
Id.
Id. at 985.
Id. at 987.
Id.
See supra Part II.A–B.
Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 987.
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could have viewed them again if he or she needed to do so. Further,
like in Quon, since it was not clear that messages were left permanently, the dicta in Theofel did not apply.198
While the result the court came to with regard to webmail is certainly in agreement with Flagg, it seems to be inconsistent with the
analysis in the questions arising about Facebook and MySpace posts.
Facebook and MySpace posts present a unique problem since they are
posted with the idea that multiple people will see the post. In its analysis, the court analogized to electronic bulletin board systems
(BBS).199 The electronic bulletin board systems were directly contemplated in the committee reports and were meant to be covered by the
SCA.200 These systems work by disseminating messages to multiple
subscribers. A user sends a message to the system, then anyone else
who subscribes to the message board can view the message.201 Provided that there are some restrictions to the general public, electronic
bulletin board messages are protected under the SCA.202 However, it
was not clear whether a BBS is an ECS or RCS. The court noticed that
multiple other courts had faced the same question and disagreed on
whether it was an RCS or an ECS, but they hardly provided any explanation for their choice—leaving little guidance.203 One such case was
a Ninth Circuit opinion concluding that a BBS was an ECS, but the
court did not explain why.204 The court concluded that since the BBS
was the final destination of these messages, they could hardly be considered held for temporary, intermediate storage under section (A).
So, following the earlier case, the court held that messages on a BBS
must be stored for backup protection, even after being viewed.205 The
court explained that this was consistent with Theofel and Quon because
“a user’s . . . passive decision not to delete a communication after it
has been read by the user renders that communication stored for
backup purposes . . . .”206 While this does seem to comport with the
198 See supra Part II.A–B.
199 Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 988.
200 See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 8–9 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3562.
201 Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 980 (“The latter is essentially email directed to the
community at large, rather than a private recipient.” (quoting MTV Networks v.
Curry, 867 F.Supp. 202, 204 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.1994))).
202 Id. at 981.
203 Id. at 988. Compare Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 879 (9th
Cir. 2002) (finding a BBS was an ECS provider), with Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S.
Secret Serv., 816 F. Supp. 432, 443 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (finding a BBS was an RCS
provider).
204 See Konop, 302 F.3d at 879.
205 Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 989.
206 Id. (emphasis added).
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holdings in both Theofel and Quon, it seems contrary to the court’s
earlier interpretation of webmail. The same argument for why viewed
messages on a BBS are stored by an ECS could apply to webmail, as
webmail users typically “passively” decide not to delete messages after
they are viewed.
The court held that Facebook and Myspace effectively work as
private BBS. Each user has a page, or a “wall,” in which people can
post messages. Anyone who is a “friend” of that person may see the
posts.207 Because they are analogous to BBS, the court concluded that
Facebook and Myspace were ECS providers, and wall postings were in
electronic storage.208
The court alternatively held that the messages were protected
because the servicers were RCS providers.209 The court analogized to
a case involving YouTube, a video sharing and storage service on the
Internet.210 The court held that YouTube acts as an RCS since its primary role is to store videos that people may access. So long as the
users placed restrictions on who could view the videos, they would be
protected under the SCA.211 Under this theory, the court concluded
that Facebook and MySpace act as RCS providers because they store
others’ messages. It is no problem that people can retrieve the
messages, because like in Flagg, an RCS must have a retrieval
mechanism.212
III.

TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES INCREASE CONFUSION

As the above cases have shown, courts have had a very difficult
time applying the SCA’s categories to service providers. This has created a situation in which courts could find ways to make either category apply. The task of distinguishing has become more difficult with
advances in technology. As shown in this section, as Internet sites
begin to do more and more tasks, the line between storage and communication is further blurred. By analyzing Dropbox, social networking sites, and webmail, this Note will show how a court could use the
arguments in the cases in the previous section to categorize each of
these services as either an ECS or an RCS, depending on the result
sought.
207 See infra Part III.C.
208 Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 988–89. This is true so long as the user places some
restrictions on access.
209 Id. at 990.
210 Id.; see Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
211 YouTube, 253 F.R.D. at 264–65.
212 Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 990.
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A. Dropbox
Dropbox213 is a file storage and sharing service on the Internet.
A user can save any files from her computer to Dropbox and then
access and edit the files from any other computer. The service also
allows users to share files with other users. This allows multiple users
to share information or work on the same project and store it in one
location.214 Initially, providers like Dropbox would seem to clearly fall
within the category of RCS. The user electronically transmits his data
to the service to be stored and then accessed at a later time.
However, the analysis is not so clear when the sharing function is
considered. The service could easily be seen as transmitting electronic communication, and thus as a provider of ECS.215 As an example, suppose two professors are working on an article together with
the assistance of a research assistant. One professor writes a section of
the article, edits another portion, and then uploads it to Dropbox.
The next professor opens it, reviews the additions and changes, and
then adds her own new material along with some notes for suggested
changes to earlier portions. After she saves it, the research assistant
opens the file to edit the document and supplement the footnotes.
He uploads his revisions for approval from the two professors. They
then open the document to review and consider the changes, suggested changes, and edits to determine what they will keep.
The service is essentially still just acting as remote storage. However, due to the shared access and ability to change, the users are all
using the service to communicate with each other. The service is
essentially transmitting electronic communication to the recipients
who can then open it and view it, before sending it off again. With
this scenario, then, the service is acting as an ECS. Under the Flagg
rule,216 the service would be acting as an ECS until the other user
opened and viewed the document. If the user takes no further action,
the file saved on the server would then be in storage and Dropbox
would go back to acting as an RCS. However, under the Theofel/Quon
rule, even after viewing the document, the file still stored on Dropbox
would be there for backup protection, and thus still covered by ECS
rules.217 Under either test, as soon as the recipient uploads changes
for another’s review, Dropbox again would be acting as an ECS.
213 DROPBOX, http://www.dropbox.com (last visited Aug. 22, 2012).
214 Features, DROPBOX, http://www.dropbox.com/features (last visited Aug. 22,
2012).
215 See supra Part I.B.
216 See supra Part II.C.
217 See supra Part II.A–B.
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B. Webmail
As described above, e-mail at the time of the enactment of the
SCA involved sending a message to the provider who would store it
until the recipient could download the message to his or her own
computer.218 Even as e-mail became automatic, it still usually involved
downloading the message to the user’s computer through an e-mail
client such as Microsoft Outlook or Apple Mail. Now, however, many
use webmail as their primary account through services such as
Microsoft’s Hotmail, Gmail, and Yahoo! Mail. A user never needs to
download the message to one’s own computer.219 Rather, the user
logs into his account on the provider’s site and views his messages
there. Once the message is sent to the recipient, it stays in the same
location, unless the user voluntarily deletes it. This allows users to
view their messages from any location with an Internet connection.220
The courts have consistently treated webmail services as providers
of ECS, at least until the message is read.221 This makes sense because
webmail provides basically the same function as older forms of e-mail
and electronic communication. Simply, webmail, like all e-mail, is
sending messages from one to another. The main controversy
remains in differing approaches to categorizing messages after they
have been viewed. However, it is not so clear that webmail providers
could not be understood as providers of RCS the entire time. When a
person sends a message to a webmail account, the message is essentially uploaded to the provider’s server where it is stored. The “recipient,” by going to his account to view the message can really just be
seen as viewing something in electronic storage. The location of the
message does not change post viewing—the online inbox is the final
location.222 It is not downloaded or changed—it just remains in the
same place. In this sense, it is very similar to Dropbox—a person’s
webmail account is merely a place where information is stored that
only he may access. Webmail, then, could be seen as a provider of
218 See supra Part I.A.
219 See United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 772 (C.D. Ill. 2009).
220 See id.
221 See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 987 (C.D. Cal.
2010).
222 See Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 772; see also Snow v. DIRECTTV, Inc., No. 2:04CV-515FTM33SPC., 2005 WL 1226158, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 9, 2005) report and recommendation adopted, Snow v. Directv, Inc., 2:04CV515FTM-33SPC, 2005 WL 1266435
(M.D. Fla. May 27, 2005) aff’d, Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2006)
(“Rather[,] his website is the final destination for the information posted . . . .”).
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RCS, a provider of remote storage with very specific restrictions on
who can gain access to any given piece of stored content.223
C. Facebook
A third type of modern electronic communication provider is the
social networking site. These sites allow people to reconnect, network, and communicate with people on the Internet. The most popular social networking site224 is Facebook.225 Users create profiles on
which they put personal information such as birthdate, relationship
status, interests, activities, favorite books, etc.226 Depending on their
privacy settings, only “friends,” or people they approve, can see that
information. As part of each user’s profile there is a “wall,” an electronic message board, on which the user or the user’s friends can post
comments, videos, articles, and pictures. Access to posts may be
restricted to all friends or specific friends.227 Facebook also contains a
message service operating similar to webmail. A user can send a private message to one or more friends, which will only show up in the
recipient’s message box.228 Finally, users may join “groups,” or topicspecific message boards, that allow users to share with specific
people.229
The message function of Facebook is analogous to webmail, as it
facilitates the sending and receiving of messages that are stored in the
online mailbox. Therefore, the same results would occur as in the
webmail analysis above. The more complicated question arises with
the wall posts. Crispin analogized the wall posts to electronic message
boards, as they serve similar functions.230 As Crispin realized, though,
223 An interesting point has been raised by scholars over the effects of the SCA on
cloud computing. Since many of these services use the data stored by users to tailor
advertisements to the user, providers are authorized to use the contents, taking it
outside the scope of the restrictions on disclosure by RCS providers. See William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1212–23 (2010).
224 See Andy Kazeniac, Social Networks: Facebook Takes Over the Top Spot, Twitter
Climbs, COMPETE PULSE (Feb. 9, 2009, 2:01 PM), http://blog.compete.com/2009/02/
09/ facebook-myspace-twitter-social-network/.
225 FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Oc. 12, 2012).
226 Facebook Glossary, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/glossary (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).
227 Basic Privacy Controls, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/privacy/
basic-controls (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).
228 Facebook Glossary, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/glossary (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).
229 Id.
230 See supra Part II.D.
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it is not easy to categorize wall posts. First, they can be categorized as
ECS providers. A wall post, like a message board post, is electronic
communication from one person to another, or many. So long as
there are some privacy restrictions, they are not public communications. Second, they can be categorized as RCS providers. While Crispin held this as an alternative argument, it is probably more
persuasive. Like videos stored on YouTube and information stored on
Dropbox, by posting messages, pictures, and articles, people are storing that information on Facebook. While many can access it, the user
can restrict access as much as he or she wants. And, as is frequently
stated, an RCS must have some way for users to retrieve the
information.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. A Legislative Response
After repeated criticism and calls for amendment,231 a proposal
has been introduced in Congress. Senator Patrick Leahy, the author
of the original ECPA and SCA, introduced the Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011 on May 17, 2011.232 Senator Leahy said he introduced the bill because:
[T]oday, [the ECPA] is significantly outdated and out-paced by
rapid changes in technology and the changing mission of our law
enforcement agencies after September 11. . . . With the explosion of
new technologies, including social networking sites, smartphones
and other mobile applications, there are many new benefits to consumers. But, there are also many new risks to their privacy.233

The bill is meant to close many of the loopholes and inconsistencies that have arisen from the original act,234 provide new protections
for location information, and provide new tools to enhance cyber
231 A group of large electronics companies such as Adobe, AOL, and Google
formed an advocacy group seeking change of the law. See DIGITAL DUE PROCESS,
http://www.digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=37940370-2551-11DF-8E0200
0C296BA163 (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).
232 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S. 1011,
112th Cong. (2011), available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
BillText-ElectronicCommunicationsPrivacyActAmendmentsAct.pdf.
233 Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, On
Introduction of The “Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of
2011” (May 17, 2011), available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahyintroduces-benchmark-bill-to-update-key-digital-privacy-law.
234 Senator Leahy stated that “[u]nder the current law, a single e-mail could be
subject to as many as four different levels of privacy protections, depending upon
where it is stored and when it was sent.” Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL110.txt

2012]

unknown

Seq: 31

a distinctionless distinction

6-DEC-12

11:03

519

security and national security. While the proposed Act does solve
many of the enforcement discrepancies, it still leaves unaddressed
some of the inconsistencies that have been brought to light.
The first part of the bill amends a small part of § 2702 voluntary
disclosure. It expands the 2702(a)(3) prohibition on knowingly
divulging records to the government235 in two ways. First, it keeps the
electronic communication service and remote computing service distinction, but adds a third category: geolocation information service.
Second, it increases the scope of the clause to include records and any
contents listed in § 2703(a).236
The amendments that most affect the discussion in this Note are
those to § 2703 on compelled disclosure.237 The proposed amendments remove the 180 day rule that places different standards for disclosure of electronic communication from an ECS.238 Further, it
combines what had been § 2703(a) pre-180 ECS communications and
§ 2703(b) post-180 ECS communication and RCS communication.239
This raises the legal standard for attaining content stored or
processed by an RCS to the same level of ECS content. Now, all content would require a federal or state warrant. The government must
provide notice to the subscriber or customer within three days of
receiving the contents. However, like in the current Act, notice could
be delayed for up to ninety days if a judge determines it would hurt
the trial or investigation, or would endanger national security.240
The amendments change very little for non-content information
such as records. The government may compel disclosure of records
from both ECS and RCS providers through a warrant, court order, or
consent. For identification information, a subpoena will suffice.241
No notice would be required for non-content records. The rest of the
amendments deal with requirements for attaining geolocation service
information and cyber security.242
The amendments take a very positive step forward by removing
the 180 day rule for ECS communication—a distinction that no
longer makes sense. Further, by bringing disclosure by RCS providers
up to the same level as ECS providers, the amendments remove one of
the most inconsistent parts of the present law. While it does not
235 See supra Part I.C.
236 S. 1011 § 2.
237 See supra Part I.C.
238 S. 1011 § 3(a)(1).
239 Id.
240 Id. § 4.
241 Id. § 3(a)(1).
242 Id. § 5–8.
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remove the underlying ECS/RCS distinction, it removes one of the
ways that distinction plays out. Now, the government will need to
apply to the same standard whether the provider is classified as an
ECS or an RCS—making the distinction much less important.
While the amendments move in a positive direction by removing
one inconsistency, the bill falls far short by leaving the underlying
ECS/RCS distinction in place. Most of the cases discussed above, and
most of the circumstances in which this issue is actually litigated,
involve discovery in civil suits where the classification makes a big difference in determining who must give permission for disclosure.
Courts will still be forced to struggle through the same arguments
made above in determining how to proceed with electronic discovery.
B. A Modern Approach
In order to truly remove confusion and conform the SCA to modern technology, Congress must remove the ECS/RCS distinction by
combining the categories under one disclosure standard. The Act
should be amended by creating one category called “Electronic Computing Service.” This designation would apply to any service which
provides the users thereof the ability to send or receive, store, or process electronic information.243 The Act should protect any information held as part of the service provided or held incidental to the
service provided.244 This new definition would include services as distinct as Webmail and Dropbox, and would cover all information
stored by these services.
The current prohibition on voluntary disclosure of content information and the relevant exceptions245 should remain in place. Exception 3, however, should be changed to reflect the new Electronic
Computing Service definition. The SCA presently allows for disclosure with the lawful consent of senders or receivers for ECS providers,
and for disclosure with the lawful consent of senders, receivers, or subscribers for RCS providers.246 With the combined category, it should
only allow for disclosure with the consent of the senders and receivers,
but not the subscribers. Therefore, in the case of a civil dispute, a
243 This definition combines the definitions of ECS and RCS found at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510(15) & 2711(2) (2006), respectively.
244 This replaces the categories in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 (17)(A)–(B), and removes
the confusion that arises in distinguishing between storage incidental to the transmission and storage for backup purposes and can include long term storage. See supra
Part II.A–B (explaining the difficulty that courts have had with the inclusiveness of
these sections).
245 See supra Part I.C.1.
246 See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b).
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party could not retrieve content pursuant to a third party subpoena to
the provider, but would instead need to compel the consent of the
sender or receiver.247
Finally, like in Senator Leahy’s proposed amendments, Congress
should do away with the 180 days requirement for compelled disclosure of electronic communication. Under the SCA’s compelled disclosure prohibitions, the government is only required to produce a
warrant if the communication is in electronic storage by an ECS for
less than 180 days. If it has been in storage for more than 180 days, or
is held by an RCS, the government need only produce a 2703(d)
order and provide consent.248 With the combined definition here,
Congress should amend the compelled disclosure requirements to
require that the government provide a warrant to obtain any content
held by an ECS no matter the length of time.
By combining the ECS and RCS categories into one category and
changing the rules for voluntary and compelled disclosure to reflect
the higher burden, Congress can amend the SCA to account for
changes in technology and protect the privacy of those using it.
Courts will no longer be faced with the confusion confronted in Theofel, Quon, Flagg, and Crispin,249 nor will they be able to make either of
two different categories with competing disclosure standards apply
based on the results sought.250 Webmail, Facebook, and Dropbox all
would fall under the ECS category and only one set of disclosure standards would apply.
CONCLUSION
As this Note has argued, the ECS/RCS distinction in the Stored
Communications Act has created categories that do not adequately
deal with the controversies that arise. The standards overlap in such a
way that the courts have difficulty categorizing various service providers. This has led to a situation in which a court could apply either
standard depending on the result it seeks to attain. These difficulties
have only been exacerbated by the changes and developments in
Internet technology. As a result, calls for changes to the law have
come from many quarters. Legislators have responded by introducing
a new bill to amend the SCA. While the bill goes far in removing the
discrepancies in discovery standards, taking much of the bite out of
247 And not the consent of the subscriber, as was the case in Flagg. See supra Part
II.C.
248 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b); see also supra Part I.C.2.
249 See supra Part II.
250 See supra Part III.
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the ECS/RCS distinction, the fundamental distinction still remains
and will still play an important role in civil discovery. These problems
will only be solved once Congress decides to remove the ECS and RCS
categories.

